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 1 
Summary 
The present master thesis is devoted to the analysis of the current state of trade 
relations between the European Union and the Russian Federation. Following Russia’s actions 
in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, several sets of restrictive measures were imposed on Russia in 
the aim of condemning its political behaviour. But the outcomes were unexpected: the 
Russian Federation responded with its own countersanctions. As a result, both parties incurred 
economic losses. However, Western sanctions were not effective in political terms, as they 
did not force Russia to change its position on the Ukrainian crisis situation. The restrictive 
measures still remain in force. 
This research aims at analysing the implications of the sanctions regime for both 
Russia and the EU and suggesting different scenarios for the future of economic relations 
between the parties.  
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Abbreviations 
BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
CIS – The Commonwealth of Independent States 
DCFTA – Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
EACU – Eurasian Customs Union 
EaP – Eastern Partnership 
EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EU – European Union 
GATT – The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDP  – Gross Domestic Product 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
MFN – Most Favoured Nation 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NGO – Non-governmental Organisation 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
SWIFT – Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
TEU – Treaty on European Union 
TFEU  – Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
U.S. – The United States of America 
UN – United Nations 
WTO – World Trade Organisation  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 The purpose of the thesis and delimitations. 
The vast majority of the countries in today`s globalised world are so intertwined that it 
appears to be extremely challenging if not impossible to imagine that one of the major 
countries could be isolated without consequences for the rest of the world. The economical 
and political interactions between the countries point to the fact that the intention of one or 
several countries to show their disapproval of the external policy of another country is likely 
to produce negative spillover effects not only to the target state but also to the sanction 
imposing countries themselves.  
At the same time, for the past decades different types of sanctions have served as a 
common tool of “punishment” for various kinds of wrongdoings by one country or another 
that enables the punishing states to avoid military actions. However, are those sanctions really 
effective against Russia? Do they live up to the expectations of the countries imposing them 
bearing in mind the countersanctions introduced by Russia? What are the perspectives for 
trade relations between the EU and the Russian Federation? These are the research questions I 
am going to investigate in this master thesis.  
The present thesis is devoted to trade relations between the EU and Russia in the 
present time period and the changes that the recent developments in the international relations 
have brought to the trade between the EU and Russia, namely the imposition of sanctions 
against Russia and Russian response to those measures. The trade between these two actors is 
significant in size: Russia is EU`s third largest trade partner whereas the EU is Russia`s 
largest trade partner, hence this topic appears as important for both parties involved.   
In 2012 Russia finally became the member of the WTO after years of negotiations. 
The membership in the WTO has given Russia access to the markets of other WTO member 
states at the Most Favoured Nation principle conditions. At the same time WTO membership 
implies that Russia has to follow its commitments concerning further opening of trade regime 
and acceleration the country`s integration in the world economy that made the accession 
possible.  
In 2014, after the events in Ukraine the EU, the U.S. and some other countries have 
introduced a series of economic sanctions against Russia. In response to those measures, 
Russia imposed its own sanctions against those countries. The immediate result of those 
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restrictive measures was the loss of revenue for both sides. The detailed effects of the sanction 
regime and its impact on the state of trade relations between the EU and Russia will be 
presented and analysed in the following chapters of the present thesis. 
Given the fact that the scope of this master thesis is limited it is impossible to cover all 
the aspects of the abovementioned research field. For this reason the thesis will primarily be 
focused on the economic sanctions and anti-sanctions, although the other types of restrictions 
that are currently in force will also be briefly mentioned. The purpose of the present work is 
to identify the challenges in the present trade relations between the EU and the Russian 
Federation, to analyse the impact of the sanctions on these trade relations and their 
effectiveness as to their goal and to suggest possible ways of further development of the 
economic cooperation between Russia and the European Union. This thesis will not 
thoroughly cover trade relations between the U.S. and the Russian Federation, but due to the 
fact that the sanctions were initiated by the USA some references to that country may take 
place. 
1.2 Methodology. 
In order to fulfill the purpose indicated in 1.1, I am going to examine the relevant 
provisions of GATT, the UN Charter, other relevant acts of the EU and Russia concerning the 
imposition and prolongation of economic sanctions and the so-called “anti-sanctions”. While 
reflecting on the suitable legislation and analysing the previous cases of sanctions imposition, 
I will strive to define the concept of sanctions in general and “smart sanctions” in particular.  
Having presented the outcomes in different cases on the matter, supported by 
statistical data from various sources, I am going to elaborate on the efficiency of such a tool in 
regards to the achievement of its political and economic goal and present the consequences of 
the sanctions for both Russia and the different countries in the European Union. 
During the research I will analyse the Union legislation in the field of trade, the 
relevant case law of the European Courts, but also scientific articles, databases, empirical data 
and textbooks in order to cover the topic of the current state of the economic EU-Russian 
relations in the context of the sanctions imposed and present potential outcomes and 
perspectives for development of the present situation. 
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2  The theoretical basis of sanctions. 
2.1 The brief history of traditional comprehensive sanctions. 
  Throughout the history sanctions have been a common foreign policy instrument of 
most states. In his book on economic sanctions Kern Alexander states “<n> ations have relied 
on economic sanctions not only to influence foreign policy and national security objectives 
but also to respond to domestic political needs and economic pressures”1. Economic sanctions 
have historically been imposed in order to reduce the economic strength of the target country. 
Those sanctions were always a part of a broader military programme and they were 
introduced because the economic might and the military potential of a state have a strong 
connection: the second one is not possible in an economically weak country, hence, if the 
financial potential of the target is undermined, it becomes a lot easier to perform military 
actions against the said state.  
In addition to aiming at the economic strength, those sanctions were also targeting the 
political sector of the country by indicating the political message not only to the current target 
state, but also to its allies and/or neutral third parties. This political angle of economic 
sanctions was important because those sanctions “could be used to convey a message, for 
instance, that tensions were escalating between two countries and that alternative policies 
were needed to avert military conflict”2. 
However, it was not until 1920’s that countries began to impose economic sanctions as 
separate measures not meant to serve as “subordinate instruments of military policy during 
times of war”3. In 1920’s the situation changed with the establishment of the League of 
Nations that in its Covenant 4  allowed the use of economic sanctions against states that 
committed acts of external aggression that threatened territorial integrity and existing political 
independence of the Members of the League5. In the event of such external aggression or in 
the event of threat or danger of such aggression the Council of the League was to advise upon 
                                                 
1 Alexander, Kern, Economic Sanctions: Law and Public Policy [Elektronisk resurs], Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 
2009, p. 8. 
2 ibid., p. 12. 
3 ibid., p. 8. 
4  The Covenant of the League of Nations (Including Amendments adopted to December, 1924), source: 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp. 
5 ibid., art. 10. 
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the means by which the obligation to respect and preserve the territorial integrity and existing 
political independence should be fulfilled.  
The possibility to impose economic sanctions was introduced in Article 16 of the 
Covenant. Those economic sanctions had a very broad scope, as that Article stated that in case 
one of the member states of the League of Nations resorts to war against other members, they 
agreed to immediately “subject it <the target> to the severance of all trade or financial 
relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the 
covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal 
intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any 
other State, whether a Member of the League or not”6. In addition to that, the member of the 
League agreed to support each other in imposition of those financial and trade restrictions “in 
order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures”7. So, the 
Members of the League agreed to apply economic sanctions automatically and mutually in 
case of military threat to one of them.  
In the modern history of cross-border trade relations such measures as economic 
sanctions are not a rare and oustanding case. In fact, during 1990s sanctions regimes were 
imposed by the UN so many times that this period was called the ”sanctions decade” 8 . 
However, the sanctions used in those days were conventional and they usually affected all the 
sectors of economy in the target country as well as the whole population of it. Such sanctions 
constituted burden for the society in general because they made no difference between the 
elites who were actually in charge of making decisions about the target state’s external policy 
and other people in the said country.  
The reasoning behind those restrictive measures was that if the population of the target 
country suffers a lot from the economic damage caused by the sanctions, the politics of that 
country would be more eager to compromise with the sanctioning states and abide by the 
international rules. But in reality this “pain-gain’ formula9 did not trigger the expected results 
leaving the sanction pain on the civil people and letting the political elites basically 
untouched. As Blanchard and Ripsman point out, “<i>t is questionable to assume, though, 
                                                 
6 ibid., art. 16, para. 1. 
7 ibid., art. 16, para. 3. 
8 Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Apr., 2002), 
pp. 373-403, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054192.   
9 ibid., p. 375. 
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that economic pain will always translate into political gain since there are a variety of 
techniques that policymakers can use to manage the political fallout resulting from economic 
distress”10. The assumption that the more pain the people suffer the greater political gain for 
the sanction imposers will be is based on the belief that the leaders of the target state have 
similar human rights and living standards as the punishing states.  
However, this does not always seem to be the case, especially if the target is not a 
democracy and does not share the same humanitarian and social values as the democratic 
states imposing those restrictions. The policymakers in the target state may redistribute the 
economic suffering from their supporters to opposition or private enterprises and avoid being 
economically hurt; they may also use their internal power to suppress those expressing 
negative views on the country’s leadership in connection with sanctions, so that the 
opposition will not be able to bring political changes in that state and the aim of sanctions will 
not be fulfilled.  
The burden put on the people of the target can even be used to make sanctions 
counterproductive: “damage inflicted on civilian populations may easily be exploited by the 
targeted government to argue that the sanctions regime is inhumane; in turn, this may lead to 
the sympathy for the targeted state and criticism against the management of the sanctions 
regime”11. Therefore, those sanctions did not serve their goal of condemning the target’s 
political behaviour, being too broad and comprehensive in their scope and constituting more 
of a punishment for the population than for the decision-makers. In fact, some scholars claim 
that such comprehensive sanctions are ineffective against non-democratic states: “The 
empirical findings suggest that the less democratic a country the more likely it is that 
economic sanctions will fail to change policies”12. 
Apart from that, conventional sanctions have been criticised because of the negative 
spillover effects they can cause on other states. Therefore, some states can be reluctant to 
impose restrictive measures if those are likely to affect those states. Unsurprisingly, economic 
ties between the states decrease the likelihood of imposition of restrictive measures: 
“Sanctions necessarily entail losses for the sanctioning state as well as the target state; thus, a 
                                                 
10  Jean‐Marc F. Blanchard & Norrin M. Ripsman (1999), Asking the right question: When do economic 
sanctions work best?, Security Studies, 9:1-2, p. 223, DOI: 10.1080/09636419908429400. 
11 Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Apr., 2002), p. 
376, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054192. 
12 Peter A. G. van Bergeijk, "Economic Sanctions: Why Do They Succeed; Why Do They Fail?" in van Genugten 
and de Groot (fh. 6), 106.  
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state motivated by welfare desires will prefer to sanction a state with whom it does not have 
much trade”13. So in the event that the target does have extensive trade with some of the states 
imposing sanctions, the chances of its unwillingness to implement those sanctions are high 
and so the pressure on the “misbehaving” state is reduced.  
According to the study on 1990s sanctions’ effectiveness, only 31% of the 
international sanctions imposed were effective from the perspective of the national 
government issuing them14. Given all the criticism against comprehensive sanctions, by the 
end of the decade more and more countries began to show their dissatisfaction with this 
international policy tool. Since 1994 the UN has only imposed comprehensive sanctions 4 
times15, and so the trend has moved from general sanctions to targeted ones and from states 
themselves as the main targets to private individuals, entities, NGOs and other non-state 
actors. 
2.2 The modern alternative to outdated comprehensive measures: smart 
sanctions. 
 As an alternative to outdated sanctions there were introduced the so-called “smart 
sanctions”16. The idea behind these new sanctions was that they would target a specific group 
of people, mostly those in power and responsible for the decisions that triggered the 
imposition of those restrictive measures; and/or they would be directed at a specific sector of 
the national economy of the state in question. Being more accurate in targeting their goal than 
the old comprehensive sanctions, smart sanctions are supposed to put political pressure 
specifically on those responsible for the internationally condemned actions.  
A. Tostensen and B. Bull in their article17 identify two key differences between the old 
and the new sanction types. First of all, smart sanctions are more effective in aiming at the 
state’s decision-makers via travel bans, arm embargoes and restrictive measures against 
                                                 
13 David Lektzian and Mark Souva  , The Economic Peace between Democracies: Economic Sanctions and 
Domestic Institutions, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 40, No. 6 (Nov., 2003), p. 655, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3648381.  
14 The success of the sanctions was measured based on two criteria: 1) whether the sanctions imposed achieved 
their objective, at least to some extent; 2) have the sanctions imposed contributed to a positive outcome and if so, 
to what extent?. Source: Wallensteen, P, & Staibano, C 2005, International Sanctions: Between Wars And 
Words, pp. 7-8, London: Routledge, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost. 
15 ibid., p. 47. 
16 Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Apr., 2002), p. 
373, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054192. 
17 ibid., p. 373. 
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banking sector (financial sanctions). Arm embargoes may include total ban, restrictions on 
production, and supply and/or interdictions or quarantines of arms and/or arms-related 
materials or activities, such as hardware, military advice, and training 18 . They can have 
economic consequences for the target state (e.g. in the sense that military hardware prices can 
go up, but the main goal of these sanctions is “to prevent conflict or at least reduce the level 
of violence by denying protagonists the means to carry it out”19. From the EU perspective arm 
embargoes cover sales, supply, transport of the goods included in the EU common military 
list20, as well as technical support required for those goods. Sometimes goods of dual use may 
also be included in such an embargo.  
Another type of smart sanctions – financial sanctions – are imposed in order to 
“diminish financial capacity of the sanctionee and key business interests to withstand external 
pressure”21. They aim at weakening the banking system of the target state so that this state 
experiences economic trouble that is likely to increase its willingness to change its external 
policies. But the results of financial sanctions can be contradicting with their aim as political 
elites may still remain reluctant to change their policies unless their own financial assets are 
severely affected (e.g. foreign assets are frozen, private bank loans are denied etc.) by such 
restrictive measures. Even if such targeted financial measures are implemented they are 
difficult to maintain, as they require tracing of private assets of the political elites and their 
family members. If the EU imposes asset freezes, it means that such funds as cheques, bank 
deposits, cash, shares, stock, as well as other tangible or intangible assets of the target 
persons, may not be sold or accessed. In addition to that, an asset freeze means that it is 
prohibited to provide resources to the targeted individuals or entities, so that European 
citizens and companies should not conduct any operations aimed at financing those entities or 
individuals.  
                                                 
18
 Randy Rydell, "Monitoring United Nations Arms Embargoes" (Paper presented at the First Expert Seminar: 
Smart Sanctions - Randy Rydell, "Monitoring United Nations Arms Embargoes" (Paper presented at the First Ex 
pert Seminar: Smart Sanctions - The Next Step, Bonn, November 21-23,1999), 3; also available at 
http://www.bicc.de. 
19 Wallensteen, P, & Staibano, C 2005, International Sanctions : Between Wars And Words, p.11, London: 
Routledge, eBook Collection (EBSCOhost), EBSCOhost 
20 COMMON MILITARY LIST OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (adopted by the Council on 17 March 2014) 
(equipment covered by Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control 
of exports of military technology and equipment) (2014/C 107/01). 
21 Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Apr., 2002), p. 
385, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054192 
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Finally, travel restrictions constitute the last type of smart sanctions. Their main target 
is political elites and their families, same as in case of targeted financial sanctions. The 
purpose of travel restrictions is to reduce the possibility of the elites to move freely around the 
world, maintain their foreign business and other contacts so that those elites are more eager to 
persuade political leaders to change their position on the questionable behaviour. Travel 
sanctions can take the following forms22: 
1) Travel bans – mean that the designated persons are denied access to international 
passenger flights based on their participation in the condemned actions or support 
of the political regime that sanctions are aimed at eliminating. They have a 
symbolic meaning of non-appreciation of those persons’ political behaviour; 
2) Aviation sanctions – include a restriction or a ban of international flights from/to 
the target state; it may cover certain airlines or all international flights, passenger 
flights and/or cargo. This type of travel sanctions can also serve as prevention of 
arm embargo violations;  
3) General transport sanctions – are put in force in relation to all means of 
transportation and cover restrictions or ban of all international traffic with the 
target country. 
If travel bans are imposed by the EU, the targeted persons will be denied entry to the 
EU at its external borders. Should such persons need visas in order to enter the Union, they 
will be denied such visas. However, EU sanctions do not entail that an EU member should 
prohibit entry to its own nationals in case they are the target of travel bans. In such cases an 
EU state is obliged to admit its own citizens.  
The second difference between the two sanction types is that as smart sanctions are not 
imposed to punish all the people of the country, they protect some sensitive social groups 
from collateral damage by excluding certain types of goods (e.g. medicines, baby food etc.) 
from the sanctions list. However, such humanitarian exemptions may constitute a weak point 
in the sanctions regime as they provide for specific conditions for some embargoed items and 
so create opportunities for weakening of the restrictive character of the measures.  
The smart sanctions have also received critical comments due to various problems 
concerning their implementation. Some of the examples are potential possibilities to 
circumvent travel bans, the difficulties in keeping track of private persons’ flights, assets in 
foreign banks and so on. It has been argued that in order to fulfill their humanitarian goal and 
                                                 
22 ibid., p. 390. 
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put the pressure only on those affecting political decisions in the target state smart sanctions 
require serious operational challenges23. Nevertheless, these new sanctions are still used quite 
frequently, the latest example being the case of Russia in 2014- 2015 that will be discussed in 
detail in the upcoming chapters. 
2.3 The notion and the classification of sanctions. 
 Given that the present thesis is devoted to sanctions, it seems logical to define the 
notion of sanctions. A. Tostensen and B. Bull define international sanctions as “the temporary 
abrogation of normal state-to-state relations to pressure target states into changing specified 
policies or modifying behaviour in suggested directions”24. Sometimes sanctions are defined 
as a type of boycott – “<b>oycott in political sciences is a protest activity in the form of 
refraining to do something such as election boycott and sanction is a penalty aimed to make 
the sanctioned country to obey the rule like sanctions against Iran”25. S. Oxenstierna and P. 
Olsson describe sanctions as “the foreign policy instrument commonly used by the 21st – 
century West to signal disapproval of countries breaking international law” 26 . More 
specifically, they state that economic sanctions should be defined as “government-sponsored 
disruptions of economic relations by one or several senders in order to achieve a change in the 
policy behaviour of the target”27. 
Another way to define sanctions is by addressing them as “a form of negative 
conditionality (opposed to positive conditionality), where the one imposing is motivating the 
target state with threats or punishment to change its economic, political or military actions”28. 
Here sanctions are defined through their compulsory element, namely, specific conditions or 
demands that have to be met by the target state in order to put an end on those sanctions. 
Usually sanctions are described as international measures that can be placed in between 
negotiations and military actions, being “less glamorous than diplomacy and less decisive 
                                                 
23 ibid., p. 402. 
24 ibid., p. 374. 
25 Sajjad Bagheri, Hamid Reza Akbarpour, Reinvestigation of the West's sanctions against Russia in the crisis of 
Ukraine and Russia's reaction, 1st International Conference on Applied Economics and Business, ICAEB 2015, 
Procedia Economics and Finance 36 (2016) 89 – 95. 
26 Oxenstierna, Susanne & Olsson, Per, The economic sanctions against Russia: impact and prospects of success, 
Försvarsanalys, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), Stockholm, 2015, p. 9. 
27 ibid., p. 22. 
28 Viljar Veebel, Raul Markus, LESSONS FROM THE EU-RUSSIA SANCTIONS 2014-2015, Baltic Journal of 
Law & Politics 8:1 (2015): 165-194 http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bjlp  DOI: 10.1515/bjlp-2015-0015. 
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than war”29. In that sense international sanctions of various types constitute a last resort 
peaceful tool that enables sanctioners to avoid military intervention of the target state.  
The UN Charter lays foundation for imposition of restrictive measures in its Chapter 
VII (Articles 39-42). Those articles provide the UN with an opportunity to use those measures 
to preserve or restore international stability. More specifically, Article 39 allows the Security 
Council to investigate whether there is any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression and to decide on the so-called provisional measures that have to be taken in order 
to restore the peace. Article 40 enables the Security Council to call upon the parties concerned 
to make them abide by the rules contained in the provisional measures before those are issued 
so as to give the parties a chance to correct their behaviour at the preliminary stage without 
being officially charged with provisional measures.  
According to Article 41 of the UN Charter, “The Security Council may decide what 
measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its 
decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations”30. Finally, Article 42 empowers the Security Council to use, as a measure of last 
resort, in case its peaceful restrictive measures have proven to be ineffective, to use military 
force against the non-complying state. In such cases the Security Council may decide to use 
actions including “demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces 
of Members of the United Nations”31. 
Hence, from the UN side, international sanctions provide a tool for completing its 
main goal of maintaining peace and security in the event of occurring threats to peace, 
security and justice by affecting the target state’s economy, communications, or diplomacy. 
The powers given to the Security Council by the abovementioned articles in the UN Charter 
have been used in a wide range of international instability situations and “this mandate has 
gradually been broadened to permit the institution of measures to deal with massive human 
                                                 
29 Milica Delevic, “Economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool: The case of Yugoslavia,” The International 
Journal of Peace Studies Vol. 3, No. 1, 1998.  
30  The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, art. 41. Source: http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-
charter/chapter-vii/index.html. 
31 ibid., art. 42. 
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rights violations, breaches of international humanitarian law, transgressions of democratic 
rule, and acts of aggression where military forces have crossed national borders”32. 
The main functions of international sanctions are in theory presented as follows: 
changing the behaviour of the target (a tool for coercion), limiting its behaviour (a 
constraining effect), or sending the target a message (a signaling effect)33. As a tool for 
coercion, sanctions aim at modifying target’s political intentions by imposing economic pain 
on that country, following the “more pain, more gain” logic. Such sanctions are primarily 
economic and they presuppose that the target is aware of the behaviour that triggered the 
imposition of those restrictive measures and is capable of changing that behaviour voluntarily 
in order to stop economic suffering. 
Constraining sanctions are used in order to make it difficult or impossible for the 
target state to perform certain actions or to fulfill certain political goals. This type of 
sanctions, in contrast to the previous type, does not require actions from the target’s side that 
will lead to lifting of those restrictive measures. The reasoning behind restrictive sanctions is 
that the target has to be prevented from continuing with its practices in the first place and 
deprived of the opportunity to commit further violations, and not at merely punishing it for 
the actions that have already been performed. In such a case potential violations appear to be 
more damaging, so that putting an end to those is top priority for the sanctioning countries.  
Signaling sanctions, in their turn, aim at giving a clear message on the fact that the 
target state’s actions and policies are not supported by the sanctioners and that if the target 
does not change those actions and policies, it will have to face the consequences. The signal 
does not necessarily have to address only the target: it “could be targeted to the international 
community, countries, populations, non-state entities or individuals”34. The damage of this 
sanctions type is primarily immaterial and come in form of reputational costs for the target 
state, however, material damage may follow indirectly, in the form of loosing foreign 
investors who no longer find it trustworthy to conduct business in the target state. Signaling 
sanctions may also indicate the beginning of a “communication war”, giving the “shaming 
                                                 
32 Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Apr., 2002), p. 
375, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054192. 
33 Francesco Giumelli and Paul Ivan, “The effectiveness of EU sanctions,” EPC Issue Paper No. 76 (2013): 9.  
34 Viljar Veebel, Raul Markus, LESSONS FROM THE EU-RUSSIA SANCTIONS 2014-2015, Baltic Journal of 
Law & Politics 8:1 (2015): 165-194 http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bjlp  DOI: 10.1515/bjlp-2015-0015. 
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and stigmatizing”35 message to the international community.  
Hence, sanctions can be defined as restrictive measures imposed in order to achieve 
the abovementioned effects. As a side note, the modern targeted, or smart, sanctions are 
believed to be effective only if they are imposed in form of constraining or signaling 
sanctions: “targeted sanctions may make sense if the aim of the sanctions is avoidance of 
future violation, since smart sanctions would rather work as a signalling or constraining tool 
than the tool for coercion”36.  
Economic sanctions could be defined as “the lack of trade and economic exchange of 
different countries with a country in order to punish due to political and military reasons”37. 
Another notion of economic sanctions, given by J. Galtung, points out that such sanctions are 
“actions initiated by one or more international actors against one or more others in order to 
punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply 
with certain norms the senders deem important”38.  
A. Kern claims that the basis purpose of economic sanctions has in its essence 
remained the same through the years of their use as tool of foreign policy. Namely, he 
indicates that the main goal of economic sanctions has always had to do with “restricting 
foreign trade and finance or withholding economic benefits such as state aid from targeted 
states or other targeted non-state actors to accomplish broader security or foreign policy 
objectives”39. Having in mind this goal, we can define economic sanctions as a foreign policy 
instrument aimed at fulfilling it.  
He also notes that even though the basic aim of economic sanctions is always the 
same, they may have various case-specific objectives, such as: “behaviour modification of the 
target, retribution or punishment, or as a signal to the target or to other third country states”40 
                                                 
35 ibid., p. 171. 
36 Daniel.W. Drezner, “How Smart are Smart Sanctions,” International Studies Review Vol. 5, No. 1 (2003).   
37 Sajjad Bagheri, Hamid Reza Akbarpour, Reinvestigation of the West's sanctions against Russia in the crisis of 
Ukraine and Russia's reaction, 1st International Conference on Applied Economics and Business, ICAEB 2015, 
Procedia Economics and Finance 36 (2016) 89 – 95. 
38 Haddadi, M. 2003, International sanctions: a tool of national policy or international executive enforcement, 
private law, Issue 3, Pages 125-126.  
39 Alexander, Kern, Economic Sanctions: Law and Public Policy [Elektronisk resurs], Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 
2009, p. 10. 
40 ibid., p. 10. 
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that can be applied individually or as a combination, which goes in line with the three types of 
sanctions’ effects described above. According to A. Kern the concept of economic sanctions 
cannot be narrowed to embrace only the goal of punishment, because in that case most of the 
modern sanctions will be excluded from such a definition as they imply not only purely 
punitive measures that cannot be lifted or reversed, but also financial sanctions (such as asset 
freezes), or export controls that can be lifted on the condition that the target state changes its 
political behaviour that triggered those restrictive measures.  
 On the basis of these concepts of definitions it is possible to derive the notion of 
economic sanctions that are the primary focus in the present thesis. Namely, economic 
sanctions can be defined as temporary restrictive peaceful measures having economic impact 
imposed by a state or a group of states against another state (target) as a whole and/or against 
selected private parties and political elites in order to force the latter to abide by the 
international rules or make political changes in the target state and/or stop violation of 
international law and human rights.  
Having described the concept of sanctions, I find it relevant for further analysis to 
introduce the classification of sanctions. As has previously been stated, historically sanctions 
can be conventional, or comprehensive, and smart, or targeted/selected, sanctions. 
In terms of the sector affected targeted sanctions can be divided into financial 
sanctions, travel restrictions and arm embargoes, which, in their turn, may take various forms 
as described in paragraph 2.1.  
Apart from those classifications, international sanctions may be mandatory – imposed 
by the UN Security Council decision, and voluntary – imposed by decision of states 
themselves. If sanctions are imposed by one country against another one, they are called 
unilateral; on the contrary, if a group of states imposes sanctions against one state, those 
sanctions are multilateral41.  
Sanctions can also take positive and negative forms. Positive sanctions usually involve 
a promise of a benefit for the target state in case that state fulfills the requirements of the 
sanctioner. Such a benefit can mean that a state promises to grant broader access to its internal 
market for the target or to increase its aid to the target in return for political reforms in the 
latter country. Negative sanctions, on the contrary, involve measures harmful and damaging 
for the target state not complying with the conditions presented by the sanctioning state. 
                                                 
41 Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Apr., 2002), p. 
374, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054192. 
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Negative sanctions can come as mere threats to impose those economically harmful 
measures against the target or as actually implemented measures imposing costs or 
withholding benefits of the target country. Nowadays there is an upward trend in using 
rewards, or positive sanctions, in pursuing the goal of political change in the target state. 
However, A. Kern suggests that the combination of the two sanctions types appears to be the 
most beneficial sanction policy strategy: “<a>n optimal economic sanctions policy should 
rely on a combination of both positive and negative sanctions, while recognising that the right 
mix will vary depending on the circumstances of each case ”42. 
2.4 Theoretical basis for effective sanctions. 
 Regardless of what particular type or combination of types of sanctions is imposed in a 
certain case, those sanctions aim is not to merely damage the target state but to make it correct 
its political behaviour in a particular way. Sanctions need to have a specific goal apart from 
economic or other kind of pain to the target in order to be successful. So what does it take to 
make sanctions work? 
 First of all, how can successful sanctions be defined? J. Hovi, R. Huseby and D. F. 
Sprinz suggest that “sanctions are successful if – and to the extent that – they extract political 
concessions from the target country”43. In other words, successful economic sanctions are 
those that actually force political changes in the country that is condemned for political 
misbehaviour. At the same time they admit that there is another way of defining sanctions’ 
success, namely, by stating that sanctions work when non-compliance with them impossible 
for the target state.  
 Some researches identify two stages at which the sanctions may work44:  
1) The threatening stage, when sanctioners announce that they are likely to 
impose certain restrictions against another state (their potential target) 
whose political actions they condemn and hope that this threat will be 
sufficient for the potential target to change its policy. This stage goes in line 
with Article 40 in the UN Charter; 
                                                 
42 Alexander, Kern, Economic Sanctions: Law and Public Policy [Elektronisk resurs], Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 
2009, p. 11. 
43 Jon Hovi, Robert Huseby and Detlef F. Sprinz, When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?, World 
Politics, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Jul., 2005), p. 483, Cambridge University Press  , 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40060115. 
44 ibid., p. 479. 
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2)  The implementation stage, when the threats did not succeed and 
sanctioners actually impose restrictive measures against their target. 
Those researches are quite skeptical about sanctions and claim that they mostly tend to 
be effective at the stage a threat to impose those measures. Such a threat can be enough for 
motivating a potential target to change its political approach. Given the data provided in 2.1, 
only about 1/3 of all implemented sanctions were effective in terms of achieving their goal. 
One of the possible reasons why the majority of sanctions tend to fail is that sanctions usually 
result in harm to population even if they were imposed against political elites. Elites usually 
find ways to pass on the sanctions burden to the population of the target state, therefore 
diminishing the effectiveness of those restrictions. Finding alternative trade partners (import 
substitution) for the target state can outweigh unilateral economic sanctions’ effect as well.   
Another reason why sanctions do not work as often as they are supposed to is that they 
induce costs not only for the target state, but also for other neighbour countries45. The skeptics 
also claim that although the sanction pressure is mean to force the people in the target state to 
distrust their political leaders, they can have a reversed effect, namely growth of patriotism, 
nationalism support of the current political regime in the target state.  
The proponents of sanctions, on the other hand, claim that sanctions can work not only 
as threats, but also after their actual implementation. However, in order for them to be 
successful, a number of prerequisites have to be fulfilled. J. Hovi, R. Huseby and D. F. Sprinz 
point out to the study46 that identifies the following conditions for effective implemented 
sanctions:  
1) Limited goals of the sanctions sender;  
2) The imposed economic burden is likely to worsen the situation in the state that 
already experiences economic trouble;  
3) The sanctioner and the target had good trade relations prior to the situation that lead 
to the implementation of economic sanctions;  
4) The sanctions have been successfully implemented in one step without additional 
measures enabling them to come in force; 
5) The sanctions costs are not high for the sanctioning state; 
6) On the contrary, sanctions are significantly costly for the target state; 
7) The sanctions do not constitute a part of a broader military plan or covert action; 
                                                 
45 ibid., p. 481. 
46 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History 
and Current Policy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1985), 81-91. 
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8) The implementation of the sanction does not require many states. 
S. Oxenstierna and P. Olsson identify a bit different set of factors that affect the 
success of economic sanctions, based on the empirical data set research conducted by G. 
Hufbauer, J. Schott, K. Elliott and B. Oegg in 2007 and on another empirical data set research 
conducted by C. Morgan, N. Bapat and V. Krustev in 2009. So, according to S. Oxenstierna 
and P. Olsson, the effectiveness of economic sanctions imposed against a certain target, 
depends on such criteria as sanction costs, trade dependency, duration of sanctions, sanction 
costs for the sender, involvement of multiple senders, involvement of international 
institutions, position of third-party countries, political regime in the target state (authoritarian 
regimes tend to be less sensitive towards economic sanctions than democracies), state 
capacity and the importance of the conflict47. 
Another view expressed by Blanchard and Ripsman is that the focus should be moved 
away from economic pain to political suffering of the target state in order to make economic 
sanctions work: “the efficacy of economic sanctions should depend not on the economic pain 
they promise, but on the corresponding political costs that the target state faces if it refuses to 
comply with the sender's wishes as well as the political costs it will incur if it accedes to the 
sanctioning state's demands”48.  
So, in contrast to the abovementioned conditions for successful sanctions, Blanchard 
and Ripsman suggest that high political costs for the target state should be regarded as the 
main criteria for sanctions success. They explain this priority shift by pointing out that 
economic sanctions are imposed to make the target change its policy; therefore, politics 
should be placed in the focus, as if political costs are not high for the target, it would have 
little motivation to comply with sanctioners’ conditions.  
On the other hand, they state that high political costs for the target do not necessarily 
lead to sanctions’ success, “since the countervailing costs of complying with the sanctioners’ 
demands also may be intolerable to the leadership of a state”49. Political costs are affected by 
various factors, such as the actual political sanctions imposed by the sanctioners, the extent to 
which threats to impose such sanctions are serious from an international perspective, political 
support from third parties, internal stability of the target state, the existence and the strength 
                                                 
47 Oxenstierna, Susanne & Olsson, Per, The economic sanctions against Russia: impact and prospects of success, 
Försvarsanalys, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), Stockholm, 2015, pp. 24-27. 
48  Jean‐Marc F. Blanchard & Norrin M. Ripsman (1999), Asking the right question: When do economic 
sanctions work best?, Security Studies, 9:1-2, p. 224, DOI: 10.1080/09636419908429400. 
49 ibid., p. 224. 
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of political opposition in the target state, the possibility of political elites in the target state to 
redirect economic costs to non-governmental actors in opposition to it50.  
They conclude that the effectiveness of sanctions depends on the relationship of 
political costs for the target state and its compliance or non-compliance with those sanctions. 
If the political costs of non-compliance are high, then the target government would be 
inclined to follow the sanctions’ conditions; if not, it will be reluctant to do so. However, if 
compliance with economic sanctions implies more political costs for the target than non-
compliance, it is unlikely that the sanctionee will change its political views.  
Given the empirical outcomes of sanctions and the relatively small number of cases 
when they were successful, it does not come as a surprise that many scholars consider 
sanctions to be an ineffective tool of foreign policy51. Then why are they still frequently 
imposed? J. Hovi, R. Huseby and D. F. Sprinz point out that economic sanctions remain a 
useful tool in light of domestic and symbolic dimensions: “sanctions might be imposed or 
sustained primarily to satisfy a domestic interest group or simply to demonstrate that the 
government cares and “is doing something”.”52.  
In order to reflect on the conditions for effective sanctions they analyse four different 
types of sanctions threat situations where the threats to impose sanctions have failed to trigger 
political change in the target state. First, the threat may have failed due to its irrelevance, in 
which case the target state cannot comply with the sanctions’ conditions because of its 
incapability to do so. In this situation sanction will fail to be effective both as threats and 
having been imposed in reality.  
Another situation suggests that a threat does not work because the target state does not 
consider it valid and credible. This is an “empty threat” situation, which actually means that 
those sanctions were not meant to be imposed in reality an, therefore, were not meant to 
actually work, at least as restrictive measures and not mere threats.  
Thirdly, sanctions’ threats can fail because they are not sufficiently potent for the 
target state in the sense that the target believes that the consequences of non-compliance with 
                                                 
50 ibid., p. 225. 
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those economic sanctions will be less damaging than the costs of compliance. In this situation, 
even though the target state regard potential sanctions as credible, it still is not inclined to 
change its policy in the event that those restrictive measures are imposed in reality. So, such 
sanctions are not likely to produce the desired political outcome.  
Finally, sanctions threat may fail if the target state thinks that the imposition of 
economic sanctions is inevitable regardless of the target’s response to those threats. In that 
case they failure can be explained by the fact that there is no sufficient reason to believe that 
those economic sanctions will be lifted if the target complies with the conditions imposed on 
it. In other words, despite the fact that the threats are regarded as credible by the target and 
that the economic sanctions are actually imposed, the target state is not changing its political 
attitude as it has does not expect that the measures imposed against it will be upheld in any 
case.  
In the same article J. Hovi, R. Huseby and D. F. Sprinz conclude that there are two 
possible outcomes if sanctions threats fail to work: either the threat was empty and those 
sanctions were never planned to be imposed; or given the non-compliance with threats’ 
conditions, sanctioners have to resort to actual implementation of the measures they have 
promised to apply against the target; but the target still does not comply due to various 
reasons described above.  
It should be noted, though, that the situations described above, are based on the 
assumption that both the sanctioners and the target have perfect information about the 
situation. However, this is never the case in reality, therefore, those situations are 
hypothetical. Moreover, they presuppose rational behaviour from both sides of a sanctioning 
situation, which is also not guaranteed in reality. This leads to the conclusion that it seems 
challenging, if not impossible, to give a valid universal answer to the question of the elements 
of sanctions’ effectiveness. The situation should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into consideration political and economic reasoning behind the actions of the target and the 
sanctioner, as well as the factual background of the issue in question between those countries.  
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3 Sanctions against Russia: factual 
background to the conflict in Ukraine, 
measures imposed and Russian 
countermeasures. 
3.1 The political background to the Russian-Ukranian conflict. 
As has been stated in the beginning of Chapter 2, sanctions are a common foreign 
policy tool in modern international relations. The present chapter is devoted to the 
presentation of the conflict in Ukraine and Russian actions in relation to that conflict that lead 
to the imposition of economic sanctions on the Russian Federation by a number of states53. 
For the purpose of the present study only the sanctions imposed by the EU will be in focus of 
this thesis.  
The situation that triggered the imposition of anti-Russian sanctions started during the 
EaP summit in Vilnius in late 2013. The Ukrainian political crisis started with the 
negotiations on the agreement on Ukraine’s accession to EU, that were suspended by Victor 
Yanukovych, the president of Ukraine at that time. At that time Russia announced its plans to 
from the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU) by 2015. That agreement has already been signed 
by Kazakhstan and Belarus, and Russia suggested that Armenia, Ukraine and Moldova could 
join as well. However, it would be challenging to combine the membership in such a customs 
union with the European DCFTA, because the idea behind a customs union is that its 
members agree on common tariffs against non-members of the Union and that would 
contradict the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU.  
Yanukovych was a pro-Russian president, and this does not come as a surprise given 
the fact that Ukraine and Russia have had strong economic, political and cultural ties 
throughout the history. He chose to wait with signing the Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreement with the EU (DCFTA-EU) for a year. Instead, he signed a bail-out loan 
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agreement with Russia. As M. Molchanov puts it, Yanukovych got in “between the two poles 
of gravity that had an almost equal value for the country: the Russian pole, where more than 
60% of all the country’s trade would normally go, and the European pole, which promised 
development, modernization and a potentially affluent future”54. This symbolic choice of 
Russia over the EU as a strategic partner “had fateful consequences”55 as it triggered massive 
actions of protest among Ukrainian people, better known as “Euromaidan”. Those protests 
resulted in dismissal of the Ukrainian president, who fled to Russia on 21st February 2014. 
The next day Ukrainian parliament elected a new, provisional government and a new 
president. 
The new Ukrainian government and president, Petro Poroshenko, being remarkably 
pro-Western, signed the DCFTA-EU agreement and began to reverse their policy from being 
Russia-oriented to EU-oriented. However, this new political orientation has been beneficial 
for the people in Ukraine. Russian-speaking regions have been put under pressure to use the 
Ukrainian language: “<o>ne of the first laws of the new government restricted Russian 
language rights in the predominantly Russian areas”56. The Russian language was also being 
replaced by Ukrainian in schools and media as Ukrainian nationalism was growing in the 
country.  
In this context pro-Russian demonstrations were held in Crimea, where a lot of 
Russian-speaking people reside. A pro-Russian local government was introduced with use of 
Russian military forces and on March 16th there was held a referendum on whether the 
Crimean peninsula should become part of the Russian Federation. The referendum had two 
options to choose between: “Do you support the reunification of Crimea with Russia with all 
the rights of a federal subject of the Russian Federation?” and “Do you support the restoration 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Crimea in 1992 and the status of the Crimea as a part of 
Ukraine?”57. Although such a referendum was not in line with Ukrainian constitution, the 
majority of the Crimean population voted for joining Russia: the voting results showed that 
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96.77% of the Crimean voters and 95.5% of the voters in Sevastopol chose to join the Russian 
Federation58.  
The Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol subsequently were 
integrated into the Russian Federation as Russian president Vladimir Putin signed documents 
admitting Crimea and the city of Sevastopol into Russia on 21st March 201459. Since then, 
war has broken out and been going on in eastern Ukraine, namely in Donetsk and Luhansk 
regions. The transition period of integrating Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian 
Federation was over in 2015, when Russia’s President signed a Decree optimising the 
structure of federal bodies of executive power60 that finalised the admission of the peninsula 
into Russia by means of additional legal and economic measures from the Russian 
Federation’s side.  
The transfer of Crimea to Russia was explicitly condemned by the international 
community. The UN claimed that the events in Crimea should be regarded as “annexation” on 
the peninsula by the Russian Federation. The UN General Assembly even held a voting on the 
Crimea referendum, and only 11 countries supported the referendum results, whereas 100 
countries refused to recognise the outcome of the Crimean voting. As a consequence of those 
events, the first wave of Western sanctions against Russia was put in place by the European 
Council in March 2014. Those sanctions were primarily targeted at individuals and entities 
taking part in the absorption of Crimea and included travel bans and asset freezes. Those 
restrictions were originally meant to expire on 15th March 2015, but they have been extended 
several times and are now valid until 15th September 2017.  
On 27th March 2014, the General Assembly of the UN adopted Resolution 68/26261 on 
Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In that Resolution the UN stressed that the referendum held in 
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and in the city of Sevastopol on 16th March 2014 was 
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not authorised by Ukraine and it encouraged the international community not to acknowledge 
the results of that referendum. Thereafter sanctions prohibiting trade with Crimea were 
introduced by Council Regulation 692/2014 62  and extended by Council Regulation 
825/201463 in response to the absence of de-escalatory steps by Russia. Those sanctions were 
originally imposed until 23rd June 2015, but are still valid through 23rd June 2017. In 
December 2014 another set of sanctions against Crimea was imposed by Council Regulation 
1351/201464, introducing tourism services restrictions and investment ban.  
Since the first wave of sanctions against the Russian Federation did not produce 
substantial results in forcing Russia to abandon the Crimean peninsula and change its policies 
in eastern Ukraine, the EU imposed another set of restrictive measures. In July 2014 the new 
wave of anti-Russian sanctions was introduced following the escalation of military action in 
eastern Ukraine with presence of both Russia’s and NATO’s military forces in the region, 
“including deploying troops and holding military exercises”65 and the tragic event of 17th July 
2014 when the Malaysia Airlines flight MH-17 was shot down over the separatist-controlled 
area; these sanctions, imposed on 31st July 2014, are economic in their nature and they are 
targeted at specific sectors of Russian economy (smart sanctions) 66 . Smart sanctions, 
introduced by Council Regulation 833/201467, affect Russia’s banking sector, restricting the 
ability of major state-owned banks to raise credit on European capital markets.  
On 8th September 2014 the economic sanctions were broadened by Council Regulation 
960/201468, cutting the duration of maturity period for permitted credits to five major Russian 
banks from 90 to 30 days and extending this restriction to include three major state-owned 
defence companies. In addition the EU imposed arm embargoes and sanctions prohibiting 
export of oil exploration equipment.  
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Russian gas sector was not targeted by European economic sanctions due to the fact 
that many EU countries are highly dependent on Russian gas deliveries and it does not appear 
to be easy to divert to alternative gas suppliers in the short or medium run. However, major 
Russian gas companies, such as Gazprom, Novatek, Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz, are listed in 
the U.S. economic sanctions against the Russian Federation. The sanctions on dual-use goods 
were extended by Council Regulation 1351/201469. The economic sanctions were meant to 
expire on 15th July 2015, but they have been extended as well as the previous sanction types 
and now remain in force until 31st July 2017.  
3.2 The EU’s sanctions against the Russian Federation. 
According to Article 21(3) TEU, “<t>he Union shall ensure consistency between the 
different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies. The Council and 
the Commission, assisted by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, shall ensure that consistency and shall cooperate to that effect”70. Plus, in 
accordance with Article 5 TEU, the scope of the actions of the Union are guided by the 
principle of conferral: “Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the 
limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain 
with the Member States”71. Since these principles guide EU’s external policy actions, they are 
also applicable in the case of imposition of restrictive measures. The abovementioned TEU 
provisions should be read and applied in conjunction with TFEU provisions on Restrictive 
Measures that can be found in Title IV. More precisely, Article 215 TFEU states that: 
“(1) Where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU), provides for the interruption or reduction, in part or 
completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority on a joint proposal from the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the 
Commission, shall adopt the necessary measures. It shall inform the European 
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Parliament thereof.    
(2) Where a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU so 
provides, the Council may adopt restrictive measures under the procedure referred to 
in paragraph 1 against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities.    
(3) The acts referred to in this Article shall include necessary provisions on legal 
safeguards.”72    
 The provision of Chapter 5 in Title II TFEU that the abovementioned article refers to 
is Article 29 TEU that indicates that the Council is to adopt decisions “which shall define the 
approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. Member 
States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the Union positions”73. The sanction 
measures, imposed from the EU’s side, were introduced by the Council in accordance with 
the provisions cited above.  
According to the Factsheet on EU Restrictive Measures 74 , European sanctions 
constitute one of the EU's tools to promote the objectives of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP): peace, democracy and the respect for the rule of law, human rights 
and international law. Those sanctions have been introduced not a merely punitive measures, 
but as a part of a comprehensive political approach of the EU that intends to bring political 
changes to the target country, namely, the Russian Federation. At the same time, targeted 
sanctions strive to minimise the damaging effect of those restrictive measures on the Russian 
population and focus on the individuals and entities that are involved in the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict.  
The restrictive measures that the European Union introduced in connection with 
Russia’s “illegal annexation of Crimea and deliberate destabilisation of a neighbouring 
sovereign country”75, include a wide range of following tools: 
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1) Restrictive measures against individuals and entities involved in the process 
of Crimea’s transferal to the Russian Federation and Russian actions in 
eastern Ukraine. The two People’s Republics, Donetsk and Luhansk, are 
also on the sanctions’ list. Such measures include travel bans and foreign 
asset freezes applied in total to 150 persons and 37 entities, that were 
“responsible for action against Ukraine's territorial integrity, persons 
providing support to or benefitting Russian decision-makers and 13 entities 
in Crimea and Sevastopol that were confiscated or that have benefitted from 
a transfer of ownership contrary to Ukrainian law”76.  
2) Diplomatic measures. Russia was excluded from the G8 summit and the 
new G7 summit was held in Brussels instead of Sochi in June 2014. Also 
negotiations on Russia joining the OECD and the International Energy 
Agency were suspended. The EU-Russia summit was cancelled, and the EU 
members decided to stop holding bilateral summits on a regular basis. 
Bilateral EU-Russian negotiations on visa regimes and on the New 
Agreement between the two parties were suspended as well. 
3) Restrictions on Crimea and Sevastopol. These restrictions include 
suspension of economic relations with the disputed region, as the EU does 
not accept that Crimea has become part of the Russian Federation. They 
include a ban on import of goods from Crimea unless those have Ukrainian 
certificates; a prohibition to invest in the region for Europeans and EU-
based companies, including the possibility to buy real estate or companies 
in Crimea and invest in certain sectors of the region’s economy; a ban on 
providing tourism services in Crimea and Sevastopol; an export ban in 
regards to goods and technology for transport, telecommunications and 
energy sector, as well as the exploration of oil, gas and mineral resources; a 
prohibition to provide technical assistance of various kinds in the 
abovementioned fields77.  
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4) Targeted sector specific measures (economic sanctions). Those measures 
are imposed in relation to certain sectors of Russian economy. They include 
financial sanctions prohibiting European citizens and entities from buying 
or selling new bonds, equity or other similar financial instruments with 
maturity period exceeding 30 days, issued by five major state-owned 
Russian banks (Sberbank, Vneshekonombank (VEB), VTB Bank, 
Gazprombank and Rosselkhozbank), three major Russian energy companies 
(Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, Transneft), three major Russian defence 
companies (Oboronprom, United Aircraft Corporation and 
Uralvagonzavod)78, subsidiaries of the abovementioned companies outside 
the EU, as well as other entities acting on their behalf or at their direction. 
Assistance in relation to issue of such financial instruments by European 
nationals and companies is prohibited, as well as providing loans with 
maturity period exceeding 30 days. European smart sanctions also include 
arm embargo covering all imports and exports of arms and related 
materials, plus imports and exports of all kinds of dual use goods that are on 
the EU list of dual use goods79. Certain energy sector equipment related to 
oil exploration and production in waters deeper than 150 meters, or in the 
offshore area north to the Arctic Circle, or to projects that potentially can 
lead to oil production from shale formations’ resources by way of hydraulic 
fracturing cannot be exported to Russia; the rest of such equipment requires 
prior authorisation from the exporting Member State80. Another restriction 
touches upon the provision of services related to drilling, well testing, 
logging and completion services, as well as supply of specialised floating 
vessels.  
5) Measures concerning economic cooperation. The implementation of EU-
Russian bilateral and regional cooperation programmes has been suspended. 
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However, the projects that deal exclusively with cross-border cooperation 
and civil society remain untouched.  
It should be noted, however, that the imposition of sanctions was an equally logical 
and easy decision for all the Member States in the EU. Many of them have had good trade 
relations with Russia and therefore were reluctant to loose their big trade partner. Basically, 
the EU Member States were split in two groups based on their attitude towards anti-Russian 
sanctions: advocates for a though stand in response to Russia’s actions and those striving for a 
more friendly approach.  
The first group included such countries as Denmark, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. Those countries, being 
traditionally regarded as “Russia-aware”81 states, were initially in favour of imposing hard 
restrictive measures, such as economic sanctions and trade restrictions, in order to put an end 
to the escalation of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict.  
The other group comprising such states as Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, 
Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Malta, Hungary, Luxembourg and Austria favoured the “business 
as usual” approach towards Russia. These countries have various intentions to be against strict 
anti-Russian policy due to their economic ties with the Russian Federation, their reluctance to 
bear the economic costs of those sanctions that would be inevitable given the fact that the 
degree of trade interdependency between the European Union and the Russian Federation is 
very high and their dependence on Russian energy resources. For example, Hungary and 
Bulgaria are reliant on Russian gas supplies; their approach can be explained by the desire to 
protect national interests. Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, pointed out that “the 
sanctions have, in fact, harmed the West more than they have hurt Russia. In politics, this is 
called shooting oneself in the foot”82.  
Hence, the EU countries had to compromise between the economic interests of the 
Member States and the political values of the Union in order to create a common approach on 
the imposition of restrictive measures against Russia, since the burden of those sanctions 
would not be equally distributed among the EU Member States. 
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As Francesco Giumelli puts it, “<t>he sanctions on Russia have created winners and 
losers, and those most vocal about them are often those with the most to lose”83. Two major 
EU economic powers, Germany and France, shared this view on further relations with Russia 
because they both had ongoing projects and investments in the Russian Federation. The U.K. 
was reluctant to impose financial sanctions that would have an adverse effect on the City of 
London that is a major investment centre.  
France, that suggested financial sanctions, was in its turn against imposition of an arm 
embargo, as it had a € 1.5 billion worth contract for delivery of two military ships Mistral84. 
Such a stand can be understood if we look at the empirical data on trade relations between 
those EU countries and the Russian Federation. Germany’s business with Russia was worth 
€75 billion in 2013 alone, Dutch-Russian trade corresponded to €37 billion, followed by Italy 
(€30 billion) and Poland (€26 billion)85. In these circumstances it is not surprising that those 
countries tried to preserve good business relations with Russia in spite of the pressure put on 
them from other EU Member States that were willing to stick to the harsh approach to avoid 
the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine.  
However, after the crash of the Malaysian airplane those countries agreed to take a 
tougher political line in regards to the situation. France resold the abovementioned military 
ships to Lithuania. Germany changed its position to a harsher approach as well despite the 
resistance of those doing business with Russia. At the same time the internal sanctions 
disputes in the EU weakened the sanctions’ regime by, for example, not targeting Russian gas 
industry in contrast to the U.S. sanctions: “the diverging opinions from the EU ́s core 
members, especially from Germany as a leading country in solving the crises, wavers the 
Union ́s credibility”86.  
3.3 Russian countermeasures in response to Western sanctions. 
Already in March 2014 Russia responded to the restrictive measures from the West by 
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imposing its own countersanctions. Initially those retaliatory measures included only 
sanctions against European political elites. Also, Russia raised the natural gas prices for 
Ukraine, so that the pressure on the latter country would increase and the exports of natural 
gas to such countries, as Poland, Slovenia and Romania would be reduced87. 
Despite the fact that the EU sanctions were meant to have a constraining and signaling 
effect instead of a punishment, in fact those sanctions do have punitive effect in the first 
place, because they do not contain precise mechanisms and conditions for lifting the 
sanctions: “Council decisions from March and April 2014 <…> stated the policy tools, 
expected impact, validity of decision and the option to revise it, but did not consist clear 
criteria to be fulfilled to end the sanctions” 88 . The same applies to sanctions against 
individuals – no clear criteria on the end of the application of those measures are provided. 
Therefore, Russia’s reaction to those measures could be seen as reasonable in the light of this.  
At a later stage, beginning from 6th August 2014, a food import embargo on meat, fish, 
cheese, fruit and vegetables, and dairy products was added to the previous individual 
countersanctions.  These measures were introduced as a response to the sector-specific 
sanctions from the EU.  The food embargo affected quite a large segment of EU-Russian trade 
relations, as prior to its implementation the agricultural food exports from the EU to the 
Russian Federation corresponded to €11,864 million, or 10% of the total EU agricultural food 
exports worldwide89. Moreover, in the time period when this measure was imposed, Russia 
was EU’s third largest trade partner, after the U.S. and China, with total trade volumes 
exceeding €326 billion in 2013. So, the countersanctions had a major impact on the cross-
border trade between the EU and the Russian Federation.  
According to the Presidential Decree as of 6th August 2014 No. 56090 and Government 
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Resolution of 7 August 2014 No. 77891, Russia imposed the agri-food ban in order to protect 
its national security in compliance with Federal Laws “On special economic measures”92 and 
“On safety”93. Article 1.2 of the Federal Law “On special economic measures” states that 
“<s>pecial economic measures are applied in cases of emergence of set of the circumstances 
requiring immediate reaction to international and illegal act or unfriendly action of the foreign 
state or its bodies and officials, posing threats to interests and safety of the Russian Federation 
and (or) the violating rights and freedoms of her citizens, and also according to resolutions of 
the Security Council of the United Nations”94. The same Federal Law indicates that those 
special economic measures can take such forms as (1) suspension, in whole or in part, of 
economic, technical, and military cooperation programs; (2) prohibition or limitations on 
financial transactions; (3) prohibition or limitations on international economic transactions; 
(4) revocation or suspension of international trade agreements to which the RF is a party; (5) 
modifications of export or import tariffs; (6) prohibitions or restrictions on access to RF 
seaports and RF airspace; (7) restrictions on tourism activities; and (8) suspension of the RF’s 
participation in international scientific and technological programs and projects, etc.95. Such 
economic measures are temporary in their nature; however, their duration is determined by 
the President of the Russian Federation. 
In the present case it is obvious that the imposition of sanctions against the Russian 
Federation was regarded as such an emergency case requiring immediate reaction. The 
Presidential Decree No. 560 prohibits or limits import of agricultural goods, food and raw 
materials originating in the countries that imposed sanctions against the Russian Federation, 
or, as the Decree puts it, “whose country of origin had either adopted the decision on 
introduction of economic sanctions in respect of Russian legal and (or) physical entities, or 
joined same”. This restrictive measure was originally put in place for one year, but it is still 
valid, for the time being until 31st December 2017.  
A number of other restrictive measures was discussed in Russia as well, for example, 
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the confiscation of foreign assets in Russia, advance prepayment of Russian gas supply, a ban 
on textile and automobile imports and the non-return of some Western equipment96. Another 
threat included a ban for aircrafts of the sanction-participating states to fly over Russian 
airspace. But those measures were never actually imposed on the sanctioners. However, 
Ukraine Airlines connecting flights were banned from flying through Russian airspace.  
In May 2014 Russia and China agreed on the construction of the new “Power of 
Siberia” gas pipeline from eastern Siberia to China. Moreover, Russia will supply 38 bcm of 
natural gas to China for 30 years starting from 2018, which corresponds to 23% of Russia’s 
annual natural gas exports to Europe97. In November 2014, during Russian President’s visit to 
Beijing, the parties signed a new memorandum of understanding concerning the export of 
Russian natural gas to China via the Russian Republic of Altai. This Altai pipeline “would 
allow Russia to optimise sales from Gazprom’s vast west Siberian resource base and to 
provide an arbitrage opportunity for switching sales between Europe and Asia”98. 
On 1st December 2014, during his visit to Turkey, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
noted that the Russian Federation would give up the construction of the “South Stream” gas 
pipeline transporting gas to Europe via Black Sea and instead turn to Turkey in order to invest 
in the construction of another natural gas pipeline that would transport gas to Southern Europe 
via Turkey 99 . This pipeline construction was meant to increase the Russian-Turkish 
cooperation on natural gas, showing that Russia is serious in its intentions to develop its gas 
exports to new customers and find new routes to already existing ones. In other words, Russia 
shows its readiness and eagerness to substitute its European clients with new possibilities in 
other parts of the world and to perform trade reorientation with perspectives for other kinds of 
cooperation with those new partners in other sectors of economy, such as defence sector, 
since Russia lost its access to defence and dual-use technologies from Western countries and 
it is no longer cooperating with Ukraine on arms matters. However, it remains uncertain 
whether trade reorientation will be successful and whether it will be possible for the Russian 
Federation to manage the construction of the abovementioned natural gas pipelines in 
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cooperation with China and Turkey timewise.  
Apart from food embargo, in 2015 Russia several times denied entry for different 
European Union officials, and in May Russian blacklist including 89 EU individuals was 
released to the EU countries’ governments100, but according to the Dutch Foreign Ministry the 
letter with that list said it was not supposed to be made public, neither did it contain any 
criteria or conditions on the basis of which those EU officials were banned from entering the 
Russian Federation101. It has therefore been debated whether Russian countermeasures can be 
qualified as sanctions from theoretical point of view, “as not including independent conditions 
and description of expected policy change from the EU side (except lifting the sanctions)”102.  
However, following the same reasoning, EU sanctions could also be questioned on the 
same grounds as they, in the updated version, only indicate the quite vague condition for their 
ending: “The EU remains ready to reverse its decisions and reengage with Russia when it 
starts contributing actively and without ambiguities to finding a solution to the Ukrainian 
crisis”103. The question of the sanctions’ legitimacy remains the topic for heated discussions 
and it will be analysed in the following paragraph.  
3.4 The sanctions legitimacy debate. 
Apart from being questioned from theoretical perception, anti-Russian sanctions and 
Russian countermeasures have also been discussed in the WTO context. The Russian 
Federation joined the WTO in 2012, after twelve years of negotiations. Joining the WTO 
accession was an important step, as it finalised the WTO accession of the BRICS countries. In 
addition to that Russia’s membership in the WTO means that the country has been granted 
access to the markets of other WTO member states at the Most Favoured Nation principle 
conditions.  
At the same time WTO membership implies that Russia has to follow its commitments 
concerning further opening of trade regime and acceleration the country`s integration in the 
world economy that made the accession possible. It was hoped that Russia’s membership 
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would be beneficial both for the state itself and for the EU as its main trade partner, because 
the EU would be able to benefit “from Russia’s integration into the global, rules-based system 
of trade relations”104. However, the recent developments in the trade relations between the 
European Union and the Russian Federation have proved those hopes to be wrong.  
The current sanctioning situation raises legal concerns at two different levels: 
domestic and international. At the domestic level, anti-Russian sanctions are questionable 
from the perspective of coherence between political and economic actions of the European 
Union. At the same time, on the Russian Federation’s side, the countermeasures give grounds 
for concerns on whether they were introduced solely in order to protect and promote the 
competitiveness of domestic industries105.  
At the international level, sanctions are questionable from compliance with the 
principles of international trade as well as from the WTO rules and principles perspective, 
namely, whether the sanctions imposed by the parties to the conflict comply with the 
principles of trade liberalisation pursued by the WTO. The legitimacy debate concerning the 
anti-Russian sanctions is based on the fact that those sanctions can be disputed from the WTO 
law position. The trade restrictions imposed by the EU and other Western countries prohibit 
imports from Russia. Since both the EU Member States and the Russian Federation are 
members of the WTO, and as no such restrictions are put in place in regards to other WTO 
member, the anti-Russian sanctions can be seen as a violation of Article I of GATT that 
proclaims the application of general Most Favoured Nation treatment.  
Namely, Paragraph 1 in Article I states that “With respect to customs duties and 
charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed 
on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the 
method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in 
connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,* any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by 
any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for 
                                                 
104 European Commn., EU welcomes 3 new members to the WTO, Press Release (Dec. 15, 2011).   
105 Neuwirth & Alexandr Svetlicinii (2016) The current EU/US–Russia conflict over Ukraine and the WTO: a 
preliminary note on (trade) restrictive measures, Post-Soviet Affairs, 32:3, 237-271, p. 238, DOI: 
10.1080/1060586X.2015.1039330. 
 36 
the territories of all other contracting parties” 106 . A textual interpretation of this GATT 
provision implies that the unequal treatment of Russian goods can be defined as a violation of 
the MFN principle.  
Moreover, Paragraph 4 in Article III of GATT provides that “The products of the 
territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party 
shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national 
origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering 
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use”. Given that export of arms and materials 
related to arms from Russia has been prohibited as well, this Article has also been violated in 
the current sanctioning situation. Therefore, it can be argued that the anti-Russian sanctions 
have “prima facie violated the obligations under the GATT”107 and so Russia can possibly 
challenge those sanctions in front of the World Trade Law dispute settlement forum. 
On the other hand, the sanctions imposing nations can possibly rely on another GATT 
provision, namely, on Article XXI, indicating that “nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed  
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which 
it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or    
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests (i) relating to fissionable 
materials or the materials from which they are derived; (ii) relating to the traffic in 
arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and 
materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military 
establishment; (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; 
or    
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance of its 
obligations under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of international 
peace and security”. 
                                                 
106 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 and 1947, Article I. 
107 Rishika Lekhadia, Can the West Justify its Sanctions against Russia under the World Trade Law?, 7 Indian J. 
Int'l Econ. L. 151 2015, p. 159. 
 37 
  This Article provides the so-called “security exception” that parties to the GATT 
Agreement may resort to in case they need justification for imposition of restrictive measures 
against another WTO member state. In other words, if sanctioners need to prove that their 
sanctions against the Russian Federation are legitimate, they have to claim that they were 
imposed in order to protect their national security interests. However, since the launching of 
the WTO dispute settlement body the security exception has never been used as a defense in a 
case concerning imposition of economic sanctions against a WTO member.  
  Article XXI security defence consists of two parts: procedural and substantive. 
The procedural aspect lies in the Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General 
Agreement108 the key aspect of which is that “contracting parties should be informed to the 
fullest extent possible of trade measures taken under Article XXI”109. Since in the present 
sanctioning case the sanctioners have made public their decisions concerning implementation 
of restrictive measures against the Russian Federation, the procedural requirement of Article 
XXI GATT seems to be fulfilled by the sanction imposing parties.  
The substantive aspect of Article XXI covers several material requirements that have 
to be complied with in order to invoke the security defence. First of all, sanctioners have to 
prove that their restrictive measures were taken in the time of war or other emergency 
situation in international relations, as stated in paragraph b) (iii) of the same Article. As for 
this aspect, Russia on its part could argue that the democratic procedure was followed in 
Crimea, and that the people of the peninsula made their decision on joining the Russian 
Federation freely an voluntarily. The inclusion of Crimea into Russia was also ratified by the 
Russian Parliament as a bilateral pact between the two nations, therefore “no other nation has 
any locus standi to interfere in their bilateral affairs”110. On the other side, sanctioners could 
claim that Russia’s actions constitute a violation of the basic principles of international law, 
namely the principal of territorial integrity declared in the United Nations General Assembly 
“Friendly Relations Declaration”111. They could also claim “a valid secession requires full 
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consent of the concerned government”112 and Russia should have waited until the Ukrainian 
part restored a valid government in Crimea before holding a referendum.  
The second condition of the substantial aspect of Article XXI GATT is that there has 
to be a threat to the sanctioning country’s essential security interests. In that regard Russia 
could claim that there is no reason to believe that the transfer of Crimea to the Russian 
Federation implies any direct or potential security threat to Western countries. On their side, 
the sanctions imposing countries could reply with the globalisation argument saying that in 
the modern world it seems impossible to think that there will be no spill-over effects to other 
countries as a result of the secession of Crimea.  
The last requirement of Article XXI concerns the necessity of the measures imposed in 
order to achieve the goal of protecting the sanctioner’s security interests. The term 
“necessary” has not been interpreted in relation to Article XXI GATT, and the determination 
of “essential security interests” is left to the concerned states 113 . Hence, it is up to the 
sanctions imposing countries to determine what measures are deemed necessary to protect 
their essential security interests. They could argue that without those measures their sanctions 
against Russian would constitute a mere empty threat and, therefore, they would not work.  
To sum up, both parties seem to have valid arguments should the validity of trade 
restrictions imposed on the Russian Federation be contested in front of the World Trade Law 
dispute settlement forum. But since such a claim has not been raised, the outcome is difficult 
to predict. However, the political influence of the Un that strongly condemns Russian actions 
in Crimea and eastern Ukraine has a great impact on the assessment of the situation and it 
does not appear to be possible to separate the economic part of the dispute on the application 
of the MFN principle from the political accusations on Russia’s recent foreign policy in 
Ukraine and Crimea.   
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4 The sanctions regime outcomes and 
consequenses. 
4.1 The outcomes of the EU sanctions against Russia. 
Having described the measures imposed bu Western countries as a reaction to Russia’s 
actions in Crimean and eastern Ukraine, it is logical to follow the consequences of various 
types of those sanctions. The present chapter is devoted to the analysis of the outcomes of the 
sanctions regime, both for the target state (Russia) and for the sanctioning state in the context 
of Russian countermeasures. The final part of the chapter will provide the author’s attempt to 
reflect on potential developments of the trade relations between the Russian Federation and 
the European Union and the future of the sanctions regime that is still in force.  
As for the original sanctions set, including restrictive measures against selected 
individuals, those sanctions did not have the effect they were aiming at: growth of pressure on 
the political elites in charge of Russia’s external policy and change of Russia’s political 
behaviour. The individual sanctions have caused the so-called “rally around the flag effect”: 
“<r>ather than shake the public's support for the government, the sanctions have helped the 
government to mobilize its citizens”114. The sanctions have caused a growing patriotism and 
nationalism among Russians, and many individuals among political elites that have been 
directly targeted by the EU sanctions regard it as a sign of their belonging and contribution to 
the Crimea process: “individuals who have been publicly targeted by asset freezes and travel 
restrictions in the sanctions targeting individuals proudly declare their appearance on Western 
sanctions lists as a sign of their patriotic solidarity with the fatherland and the political 
leadership”115.  
Moreover, according to the Levada Center public opinion survey, the popularity rating 
of the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, have only risen since the introduction of the 
sanctions regime. The support for the Russian President shows an upward trend with figures 
growing from 63.5% in 2013 up to 81.5% in 2014, and for the time being 82% of the 
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respondents support Putin’s actions and policy116. Another survey shows that the unity of the 
population in Russia has also been growing drastically: the percentage of people believing 
that Russia is a superpower has grown from only 14% in March 2014 up to 68% in November 
2014117. In that light it can be claimed that the sanctions (both individual and economic) have 
failed to create a signal for the domestic population in Russia that the regime needs to 
undergo changes.  
In contrast, the imposition of sanctions has made the vast majority of the Russian 
population believe that the idea behind Western restrictive measures is to weaken Russia’s 
economy and destabilise the country. Another public opinion survey conducted by Levada in 
December 2014 has shown that only 12% of respondents associate the Western sanctions with 
the fact that the Crimea has joined the Russian Federation and that the international 
community condemned Russia’s actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. The same survey 
showed that almost 70% saw sanctions as the result of the West’s hostile attitudes and wish to 
exert pressure on Russia118. 
As for other implications of the economic sanctions against the Russian Federation, 
the situation does not appear as positive for Russia. As Tatia Dolidze puts it, “The main 
strength of the EU’s latest set of sanctions against Russia is its wide-ranging sectoral nature as 
compared to the individually-targeted ones of before, which were still restricting but were 
also restricted”119. Those sanctions have had various negative effects on Russian economy.  
To start with, the economic sanctions have targeted Russia’s oil sector given the fact 
that Russia’s economy is to a great extent resource-dependent. The sanctions’ effect was 
additionally strengthened by the drop in oil prices, a combination of which lead to a 
significant weakening of the Russian national currency, ruble. In 2014 the ruble-dollar and 
ruble-euro exchange rate fell by nearly 50%. However, the ruble has managed to partially 
recover since then. The ruble depreciation lead to capital outflow from Russia, amounting to 
nearly $ 130 billion only in 2014. 
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Another implication of the EU sanctions concerns the EU’s financial restrictions. The 
European restriction on Russia’s access to international financial markets has done damage to 
the credit conditions, which in its turn has negative effects on investment and consumption120. 
As financial restrictions affected five major state-owned banks in Russia, the consequences 
were negative for Russia’s economy in general. In October 2014 the international credit rating 
agency Moody lowered Russia’s sovereign credit rating from Baal to Baa2121. All of those 
factors could not have left the country’s GDP unaffected: Russia’s GDP growth was very 
insignificant if not equal to zero in 2014 when the Western sanctions were imposed, “being 
merely 0.2 % according to the estimate by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 0.5 % 
according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 0 
according to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)”122.  
However, Russian Government took a number of measures to mitigate the effects of 
financial sanctions. It had to cut public spending in order to support the banking sector that 
was deprived of European credits and investments. The governmental anti-crisis programme 
included such measures as bail-outs of company debts (for companies that were targeted by 
the sanctions, such as Rosneft), amnesty on repatriated capital (that subsequently turned into 
“simplification of the declaration of assets” in order to avoid money laundering) and 
introduction of a national payment system. The national payment system was a response to 
threats to exclude Russia from the SWIFT international bank communication system. The 
system called “Mir” (that could be translated both as “world” and “peace”) was launched in 
April 2015 and now the issuance of plastic cards has been put in place in accordance with the 
Federal Law “On national payment system”123.  
As for the sanctions targeting Russian energy and defence sectors, their effects have 
yet to be seen. For now it is clear that it will be difficult for the Russian Federation to 
substitute the high-tech equipment for oil and gas exploration and also space equipment and 
aircrafts. The ban EU export of advanced technology equipment in energy sector adversely 
affects new exploration projects on the Arctic shelf with perspectives of limiting research and 
exploration of oil and gas. However, the exact consequences of this ban have to be seen in the 
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long run. The defense sector is less dependent on Western technology than energy sector, yet 
with some exceptions. For example, 65-79% of Russia’s equipment in rockets and space 
industry and all of Russia’s unmanned vehicles come from abroad 124 . Another example 
concerns the cancellation of Russian-French agreement on delivery of French Mistral ships 
that has affected Russia’s military capability at sea due to the fact that the Russian Federation 
is incapable of constructing such helicopter carriers by itself125. 
4.2 Implications of Russian countermeasures on the EU. 
The Russian anti-sanctions have mostly hurt the agricultural sector of EU Member 
States. Although Russian ban affects all the sanction imposing countries, the EU is the actor 
that has been most affected by the food embargo, with the exception of poultry from the U.S. 
and fish and crustaceans from Norway, because prior to the embargo the EU was Russia’s 
first trade partner126. In 2014, the EU share in the export of the banned food products to the 
Russian Federation constituted 29% of fruit and vegetables, 24% of cattle meat, 58% of pork 
and poultry meat and 81% of dairy imports127. 
But, as has been stated before, the impact of those countermeasures has been 
unequally distributed between the European countries. Although the analysis concerning the 
EU as a whole showed that Russian food embargo amounted to less than 0.5% of the GDP in 
most EU countries128, some of them have suffered significantly more. More specifically, the 
Baltic countries are among the most affected EU Member States. Since 2010 Lithuania’s 
exports to the Russian Federation have accounted to about 10% of the countries GDP, 
followed by Estonia and Latvia with a bit lower shares, however, still higher than those of 
other EU countries. The most affected product groups include dairy products from Latvia and 
Estonia and fruit and vegetables from Lithuania.  
Other countries that were targeted by the food embargo include Poland, Greece, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain in the fruit and vegetables sector. The embargo resulted 
                                                 
124  Oxenstierna, Susanne & Olsson, Per, The economic sanctions against Russia: impact and prospects of 
success, Försvarsanalys, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), Stockholm, 2015, p. 54. 
125 ibid., p. 54. 
126 Pierre Boulanger, Hasan Dudu, Emanuele Ferrari and George Philippidis, Russian Roulette at the Trade 
Table: A Specific Factors CGE Analysis of an Agri-food Import Ban, Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 
67, No. 2, 2016, 272–291 doi: 10.1111/1477-9552.12156. 
127 ibid., p. 277. 
128 Kaspar Oja  , No milk for the bear: the impact on the Baltic states of Russia’s counter-sanctions, Baltic 
Journal of Economics, 2015  , Vol. 15, No. 1, 38–49, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1406099X.2015.1072385. 
 43 
in the price drop, that for the two main fruit and vegetables suppliers, Lithuania and Poland, 
constituted approximately 10%, whereas for the Union as whole it was only 1.9% for fruit and 
0.3% for vegetables129. 
 In order to protect the affected EU members the European Commission had to enforce 
emergency measures, especially for the fruit and vegetable sector. Those measures concerned 
market withdrawals (free distribution) and compensation for non-harvesting and green 
harvesting for the abovementioned food sector; in the dairy product sector the emergency 
measures included private storage aid and public intervention for butter and skimmed-milk 
powder. Milk produces from such countries as Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were 
granted exceptional aid and additional funds were raised for the promotion of European and 
foreign markets130.  
 It should be noted, however, that the food embargo has had implications for Russia 
itself as well. Namely, between 2014 and mid-2016 the imports of milk and dairy products 
have fallen significantly131. The same trend can be seen in the meat imports as well. Although 
the food embargo’s goal was to create opportunities for domestic agriculture food producers 
by means of import substitution, this aim was fulfilled only to some extent. As for the meat 
industry, the domestic producers have managed to increase their pork and poultry production, 
whereas Russian dairy product industry has not increased its production capacity at all132. On 
the other hand, Russian Government had to take additional measures in order to prevent the 
circumventions of the ban: for example, many food items were illegally imported via Belarus 
and other CIS countries.  
Another effect of the food embargo is the switch of trade partners with the aim to 
substitute the import of food stuffs that Russia could not manage to produce in great 
quantities. The milk and dairy products are now imported from Belarus instead of Lithuania; 
fish is imported from the Faroe Islands instead of Norway and so on. 
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4.3 Have the EU sanctions accomplished their goal? 
Having analysed the various implications of the anti-Russian sanctions and Russian 
countermeasures, I consider it logical to proceed to the question of whether the measures 
imposed against the target have had success in the present case.  
As can be seen from the previous paragraphs in the present chapter, the economic 
effects of the sanctions and countersanctions cannot be disregarded. The European restrictive 
measures have undoubtedly contributed to the weakening and destabilisation of Russia’s 
economy, whereas Russia’s food embargo has also had its negative implications on the 
economic state of particular EU members.  
Though the EU has pointed out that economic suffering for Russia was not the 
ultimate goal of the restrictive measures and that the sanctions were not imposed against the 
population of the Russian Federation, we cannot deny the indirect economic pain they have 
caused to ordinary people in Russia. As Russian Government was forced to introduce anti-
crisis measures in order to support the financial sector in the country, it had to cut funds on 
financing health care, infrastructure, and government salaries, which has created economic 
hardship for ordinary Russians133.  
However, it was the drop in oil prices and the general state of Russia’s economy that 
triggered the economic suffering of the country in the first place. Emma Ashford points out 
that the economic implications of the trade restrictions with Russia are a matter of luck: “In 
fact <…> Western policymakers got lucky: the sanctions coincided with the collapse of 
global oil prices, worsening, but not causing, Russia’s economic decline”134. 
As for the political consequences, sanctions do not seem to have worked well. On the 
international arena they have managed to partially fulfill their signaling function, as Russia’s 
actions were condemned on the UN level. At the same time, the signal of disapproval has not 
reached all the parts of the world as Russia managed to get support from other countries, such 
as BRICS, and avoid diplomatic isolation. On the internal level, the European sanctions have 
failed to fulfill their symbolic agenda. The status quo has not been restored in Crimea, which 
remains a part of the Russian Federation, and there are no reasonable expectations for its 
return to Ukraine.  
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The theoretical function of individual sanctions did not work in the present 
circumstances. Not only did not Russian elites pressure the decision-makers to change their 
political attitude, they did vice versa by proudly supporting the President Putin’s political 
agenda. In addition, the political actors targeted by asset freezes and travel restrictions were 
supported by the political leadership in Russia: “from March to December 2014, companies 
linked to the Putin cronies Arkady Rotenberg and Gennady Timchenko received 12 percent 
more in government contracts than they had during the entire previous year”135. 
 In addition to that the signaling effect of the Western sanctions has been weakened “by 
the fact that the opinions of the EU member states̕ on the issue have diverged 
considerably”136, which points out to the fact that although the EU does have a Common 
Foreign Policy and Security agenda, various members of the Union may have and do have 
different economic interests and priorities in trade, that cannot be ignored.  
 In other words, the economic effect of the anti-Russian sanctions has failed to trigger 
political behaviour changes: “although the economic sanctions are considered a successful 
pressure tool in the economic field they remain controversial as concerning the foreign 
policy”137 as, for example, in the case of sanctions against Iran, that have induced sufficient 
degree of economic suffering but have not been successful in terms of affecting the foreign 
policy choices of the target country. In the same manner, the economic sanctions against the 
Russian Federation are unlikely to force Russian leadership to abandon their external policy 
intentions and position. 
4.4 Possible scenarios for the future of EU-Russian trade relations. 
The debate on the lawfulness of Russia’s actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine as well 
as on the legitimacy of the restrictive measures and countersanctions can be never-ending. But 
the Ukrainian crisis is now a reality that the parties involved have to deal with. In that regard, 
what are the possible options of moving forward that can apply in practice in the EU-Russian 
future trade relations?  
Pernille Rieker and Kristian Lundby Gjerde point out that “<t>hroughout the crisis, both 
                                                 
135 ibid., p. 117. 
136 Viljar Veebel, Raul Markus, LESSONS FROM THE EU-RUSSIA SANCTIONS 2014-2015, Baltic Journal of 
Law & Politics 8:1 (2015): 165-194 http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bjlp  DOI: 10.1515/bjlp-2015-0015. 
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the EU and Russia seem to have expected the other side to admit the fundamental 
misguidedness of its earlier ways”138. However, the actions of the opposite party never lived 
up to those expectations, as both Russia and the EU have proceeded with their approaches 
throughout the crisis situation. It is obvious that the EU and Russia have different views on 
the situation and no party is willing to give in on its position. How could they possibly 
continue trade cooperation in the present circumstances? 
A. Dragoi and N. Pop identify four possible options for the development of EU-Russian 
relations, two of them being optimistic and the other two pessimistic, which are as follows: 
1) Pragmatic Cooperation. This is the first optimistic scenario. In this case the 
economic relations between the EU and the Russian Federation will continue; 
however their scope will be limited to the essential economic minimum, only in the 
spheres where the parties are able to come to terms with each other. Such a scenario 
presupposes gradual improvement of economic relation and potential lifting of the 
restrictive measures; 
2) The Common House. The second, and the most optimistic scenario. According to it, 
the parties will not only improve their economic ties, but also manage to find 
political compromise and common values, such as fight against international 
terrorism or other cross-border challenges in the modern globalised world. This 
scenario requires changes in the political lines of both Russia and the EU. 
3) Broken Cooperation. This is the first pessimistic option, presupposing the new 
“Cold War” situation. In this scenario the dramatic political differences of the 
parties make economic relations impossible. In the present case an outcome of this 
kind would be detrimental for both the Russian Federation and the EU, as they still 
remain important trade partners for each other. 
4) The Cold Peace. This is the other pessimistic scenario, which in essence describes 
the present relationship between the EU and Russia. In this case the parties cannot 
reach compromise on political matters, but continue the necessary economic 
cooperation. This situation implies that the economic sanctions and countersanctions 
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are still in force and the parties bear their consequences.139  
In light of the possible development scenarios described above, it appears that the two 
most drastic options, the Common House and Broken Cooperation, are the least realistic 
outcomes in the present circumstances. The first one is too optimistic and politically costly for 
both parties and, thus, is highly unlikely to happen. The second one might be more realistic 
should the parties enhance their restrictive policies against each other. At the same time it 
does not bring any benefits to any of the parties to the conflict and in today’s situation does 
not appear as a desirable outcome.  
The other two options, Pragmatic Cooperation and the Cold Peace, seem to describe 
more realistic scenarios. In essence, the key difference between those two options is whether 
economic restrictions and Russia’s countersanctions are going to be maintained or lifted. For 
the time being, the Cold Peace situation appears to continue, but in my view, the sanctions 
regime cannot last forever, bearing in mind the economic costs of those restrictions. So, 
eventually the sphere of the sanctions regime influence is likely to be reduced and at some 
point the restrictive measures will be mutually eliminated. However, such an improvement is 
only possible if both parties manage to proceed with the dialogue and find an appropriate 
political solution to the current situation. 
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5 Conclusion. 
In conclusion I would like to point out that the Ukrainian crisis has highlighted the 
interdependency of various countries in today’s globalised world. Having described and 
analysed the chronological developments of the crisis and its implications in form EU 
sanctions and Russian countermeasures, and having provided the review of the effects that 
those restrictive measures have had on both parties to the conflict, I have fulfilled the aim of 
the present research.  
In the course of this master thesis both theoretical and practical aspects of the sanctions 
were touched upon with help from scientific articles, books, EU acts, WTO and Russian 
legislation, as well as empirical data from various sources. More specifically, Chapter 2 was 
devoted to theoretical issues on sanctions, among which I presented the brief historical 
development of restrictive measures starting from conventional, or comprehensive sanctions, 
and following their evolution until present days. Afterwards, in the subsequent section of 
Chapter 2 I highlighted different approaches to the definition of the notion of sanctions and 
economic sanctions. In the same chapter I outlined various classifications of sanctions, as well 
as different theoretical conceptions on the effectiveness of economic restrictive measures.  
In Chapter 3 the factual background to the Ukrainian crisis was given and after that the 
different kinds of sanctions that the EU imposed as a reaction to Russian actions in Crimea 
and eastern Ukraine were discussed. Having presented the Western restrictive measures 
against the Russian Federation, I proceeded to analysing the corresponding countermeasures 
from the Russian side. In the final section of Chapter 3 the main concerns regarding the 
legitimacy of anti-Russian sanctions and countersanctions were presented. 
Finally, Chapter 4 covered the actual effects of the sanctions imposed by the EU and by 
the restrictive measures imposed in response by the Russian Federation. On the basis of the 
implications on both sides, and in accordance with the theoretical effects of sanctions (tool for 
coercion, constraining effect and sending a signal) the actual results of the European 
restrictive measures were compared to their goals. The effects of Russian food embargo were 
presented in the subsequent section of Chapter 4. The last section in the same Chapter 
provides potential ways of moving on for the parties to the current sanctioning situation, 
presenting both optimistic and pessimistic scenarios for future EU-Russian trade relations.  
Having reflected on the abovementioned issues regarding sanctions against the Russian 
Federation, I came to the conclusion that those sanctions have not been successful in terms of 
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achieving their political aims. The situation regarding the secession of Crimea to Russia has 
not changed because of the restrictive measures introduced by the EU and other countries. 
Neither have individual sanctions in form of travel bans and asset freezes worked they way 
they were intended to. However, the economic measures have had a significant impact on the 
Russian Federation. Those sanctions have succeeded in inducing economic pain on the target 
state, but that did not lead to the expected changes in political behaviour from Russia’s side.  
On the other side, the EU had to face economic consequences of their own trade 
restrictions as well as Russia’s agricultural products embargo. The reluctance of certain 
Member States to participate in the anti-Russian sanctions and the economic pain caused by 
the embargo show that the political decisions of EU members are influenced by their own 
economic interests in the first place. The lack of unity on what restrictions have to be imposed 
mitigated the effect of the sanctions.  
Other reasons for the not so successful results of anti-Russian sanctions include the 
support that Russia got from some Asian countries, the mitigation of the individual sanctions’ 
impact by target’s political elites, the “rally around the flag” effect in the Russian Federation 
and import substitution.  
Coming back to the research questions posed in the introduction part of the present 
thesis, I should conclude that the goal of the present research has been fulfilled, namely, the 
effects and consequences of anti-Russian restrictive economic measures and Russian 
countersanctions have been outlined and analysed. Moreover, some suggestions on the future 
development of EU-Russian economic relations have been suggested and critically assessed in 
the final section of Chapter 4.  
This master thesis provides an additional proof to the fact that the globalisation and 
interdependence of the countries in the modern world make it nearly impossible to exclude 
one of the states (especially a big and economically significant one) from the international 
arena even though that country is said to have broken international law norms. This, in its 
turn, points to the fact that economics, politics and law have become increasingly interrelated 
and it does not seem possible to analyse one aspect of the problem without touching upon 
other components. 
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